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legal and legislative issues

Supreme Court Docket
Preview: Are Changes
in the Offing?
By Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D.

Two educationrelated cases
continue to be topics
of discussion at the
Supreme Court.

asbointl.org

D

uring most Supreme Court terms,
which begin on the ﬁrst Monday
in October and usually end in late
June, the justices accept at least
one case focused on education. Two cases
before the current Court—Fisher v. University of Texas (2014) and Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association (2014)—have
the potential to affect education signiﬁcantly.
Moreover, the sudden death of Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia on Saturday,
February 13, 2016, may affect these and
other cases, especially Fisher, considerably.
Making its second trip to the Supreme
Court, Fisher reviews the use of race in
higher-education admissions, a practice
known as afﬁrmative action or race-based
admissions policies. Even though set in the
context of higher education, Fisher is likely
the more important and far-reaching of
the two cases because its outcome has the
potential to affect K–12 education
with regard to student admissions and
hiring.
Friedrichs examines whether unions may
require nonmembers to pay fair-share fees,
a prorated portion of dues, to contribute
to the cost of collective bargaining, or
whether doing so results in impermissible
compelled speech and association in violation of the First Amendment. The way the
Court answers Friedrichs could affect school
board–employee relations as well as district
ﬁnances if ofﬁcials do not have to continue
deducting fair-share fees from nonunion
teachers’ paychecks.
Although the cases are unrelated conceptually, coincidentally, after the Supreme
Court conducted oral arguments in Fisher
on December 15, 2015, its next scheduled
session was to hear Friedrichs on January
11, 2016.

Fisher v. University of Texas
Fisher v. University of Texas was ﬁled by
two white female high school graduates who
were denied entry to the university in the
fall of 2008 under a policy admitting the top
10% of graduating classes. The plaintiffs
alleged that Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law—
designed to increase minority enrollments by
granting automatic admissions to students
graduating in the top 10% of their classes—
discriminated against them because of race
in violation of their right to equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment and federal statutes. Applicants who do not graduate in the top 10% of their class can still
gain admission by scoring high in a process
that evaluates their talents, leadership qualities, family circumstances, and race.
One of the students withdrew from the
case, but Fisher, who was in the top 12% of
her class, remained active in the case even
though she attended, and graduated from,
Louisiana State University.
Judicial History
In the initial round of litigations in Fisher v.
University of Texas (2009), a federal trial
court granted the university’s motion for
summary judgment because it was satisﬁed that the use of race in admissions was
supported by a compelling interest that
was narrowly tailored to achieve its desired
end. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit (2011a,
2011b) relied on the same rationale, afﬁrming that insofar as the university had not
surpassed a critical mass of minority students that would have rendered race-based
considerations unnecessary, the plan was
constitutional.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear an
appeal in what is known as Fisher I (2012),
reversing in favor of the student in a 7–1
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judgment. Writing for the Court,
Justice Anthony Kennedy was
joined by Chief Justice John Roberts
along with Associate Justices Scalia,
Clarence Thomas, Stephen Breyer,
Samuel Alito, and Sonia Sotomayor.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented. Justice Elena Kagan did not
participate because she was involved
in Fisher I while working as the federal solicitor general.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Fisher I began by identifying the
issue before the Supreme Court as to
whether the Fifth Circuit followed

beneﬁts of diversity” (p. 2420). Concluding that the Fifth Circuit failed
to apply the proper standard, the
Court reversed the panel’s earlier
order and directed it to apply a more
stringent form of review.
In a one-paragraph concurrence,
Justice Scalia (2013, p. 2422) largely
reiterated his opposition to what he
described as governmental discrimination based on race.
Justice Thomas’s lengthy concurrence (p. 2422) would have overruled Grutter v. Bollinger (2003). In
Grutter, the Supreme Court upheld

The teachers claimed that having to make ﬁnancial
payments to support the unions violated their rights
to free speech and association because they had to
submit to opt-out procedures to avoid making those
contributions to nonchargeable union expenses.
“decisions interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . .” (p. 2416). Having determined that the Fifth Circuit
failed to apply strict scrutiny—the
highest level of constitutional analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause and
the test most difﬁcult for a state
to meet—the Court reversed and
remanded for further consideration.
Relying on the Supreme Court’s
own precedent in afﬁrmative action
cases, Justice Kennedy pointed out
that “any ofﬁcial action that treats
a person differently on account of
his race or ethnic origin is inherently
suspect” (p. 2419). In other words,
even though the justices agreed that
ofﬁcials demonstrated that diversity
was a compelling interest essential to the university’s mission, the
policy was subjected to strict scrutiny because the university failed to
devise a plan narrowly tailored to
achieve its goal without impermissibly using a race-conscious remedy.
Justice Kennedy explained that
ofﬁcials must demonstrate that “no
workable race-neutral alternatives
would produce the educational
36

the afﬁrmative action admissions
policy in the law school at the University of Michigan, noting that
insofar as diversity is a compelling
government interest, race could be
used as a factor because the criteria
were sufﬁciently narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling state interest
of having a racially diverse student
body. Justice Thomas joined the
majority, agreeing that it correctly
directed the Fifth Circuit to apply
strict scrutiny on remand.
Justice Ginsburg’s brief dissent
maintained that insofar as she
thought the Fifth Circuit correctly
applied the Supreme Court’s precedent, its judgment should have
remained in place (Fisher I, p. 2432).
On Remand
On remand, with one member of a
three-judge panel in Fisher I (2014a)
dissenting, the Fifth Circuit again
deferred to the authority of university ofﬁcials in upholding the admissions policy. The dissenter would
have invalidated the admissions
policy as insufﬁciently narrowly tailored to achieve its goal of diversity
because it relied too heavily on race.
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The Fifth Circuit (2014b) rejected
an appeal for a review by all of its
members in an en banc hearing.
The Supreme Court accepted
another appeal in what is now Fisher
II (2015). As in Fisher I, Justice
Kagan recused herself in Fisher II.
Friedrichs v. California
Teachers Association
At issue in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association (2014)
is the status of fair-share fees that
California state law, consistent with
Supreme Court precedent, allows
unions to charge nonmembers for
expenses germane to collective bargaining. Under this law, nonmembers can petition the unions to opt
out of the nonchargeable portion of
the fair-share fees they pay by seeking rebates for costs not associated
with bargaining.
Public school teachers who
resigned their union memberships
because they objected to paying the
nonchargeable portion of agency
fees—joined by the Christian Educators Association International,
a nonproﬁt organization serving Christians working in public
schools, which raised the same
issue—challenged the constitutionality of fair-share fees. The teachers
sued their local union and its ofﬁcials as well at the National Education Association and the California
Teachers Association. The teachers
claimed that having to make ﬁnancial payments to support the unions
violated their rights to free speech
and association because they had
to submit to opt-out procedures to
avoid making those contributions to
nonchargeable union expenses.
A federal trial court in California, in a brief unpublished opinion, began by relying on Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education (1977),
the ﬁrst dispute in K–12 schooling
in which the Supreme Court allowed
unions to collect fair-share fees from
nonmembers to support collectivebargaining activities. The court also
cited another case from California,
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Mitchell v. Los Angeles Uniﬁed
School District (1992), wherein the
Ninth Circuit, following the lead of
Abood, viewed the opt-out provision
as constitutional because the First
Amendment does not require an optin procedure for nonunion members
to pay fees equal to the full amount
of dues. The court thus granted the
unions’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings, meaning that it found no
reason for the dispute to head to
trial.
In a brief, unpublished twosentence opinion, the Ninth Circuit
summarily afﬁrmed in favor of the
unions. The court ruled that “the
questions presented in this appeal
are so insubstantial as not to require
further argument, because they are
governed by controlling Supreme
Court and Ninth Circuit precedent”
(Friedrichs 2014, p. *1).
The teachers sought further
review from the Supreme Court,
which agreed to hear an appeal in
Friedrichs (2015).
Reﬂections on Fisher
Fisher is the latest dispute in the
more than 40-year history of afﬁrmative action in higher education
that began in 1974 with the Supreme
Court’s judgment in De Funis v.
Odegaard. In De Funis, the justices
sidestepped the claims of a white
male law student who challenged the
afﬁrmative action policy at the University of Washington, rejecting his
claim as moot insofar as he was in
the ﬁnal semester of his studies.
Illustrative of the impact of
afﬁrmative action in education,
the Supreme Court upheld raceconscious admissions policies in
medical (Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke 1978) and law
school (Grutter v. Bollinger 2003)
admissions, but not for undergraduate programs (Gratz v. Bollinger
2002).
Further, in the ﬁrst of two cases
from K–12 education, the Court
invalidated the use of race where
it was the only criterion used in

asbointl.org

teacher layoffs (Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education 1989). The
Court later rejected the use of race
as a tiebreaker in assigning students
to oversubscribed high schools as
part of redressing educational equities in Louisville, Kentucky, and
Seattle, Washington. The Court
reasoned that the plans were invalid
because ofﬁcials in both districts not
only failed to demonstrate how the
use of racial classiﬁcations in the student assignment plans was necessary
to achieve their desired goal of racial
diversity but also overlooked alternative approaches (Parents Involved
in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1 2007a).
Fourteen years ago, in Grutter v.
Bollinger (2002), Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor’s majority opinion suggested, without offering a justiﬁcation for this time frame, that “[w]
e expect that 25 years from now,
the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the
interest approved today” (p. 343).
In light of the Supreme Court’s
agreeing to review the way in which
ofﬁcials at the University of Texas
applied the admissions policy, it
remains to be seen whether that
25-year window Justice O’Connor
described may be closing and, if so,
what the justices may offer instead.
Reﬂections on Friedrichs
Having allowed unions to collect
fair-share fees from nonmembers
in Abood, the Supreme Court later
reined in labor organizations by
requiring their ofﬁcials to account
more carefully for how they spend
funds on activities unrelated to bargaining. In fact, the Court limited
the reach of unions by agreeing
with nonmembers that requiring
them to pay for positions they do
not support and that are unrelated
to bargaining violates their First
Amendment rights to free speech
and association.
Less than a decade after Abood, in
Chicago Teachers Union, Local No.
1, v. Hudson (1986), the Supreme

Court invalidated a rebate system
because it created a risk that monies
collected from nonmembers might
have been temporarily used for
union purposes.
In a dispute from Michigan
involving a faculty union in a public college, a holding that has been
applied in K–12 disputes (Lehnert
v. Ferris Faculty Association 1991),
the Court observed that unions
could charge nonmembers for only
those expenses germane to bargaining, such as publications addressing
negotiations as well as teaching and
education generally, professional
development, and employment
opportunities. The Court refused to
permit the union to charge nonmembers for the costs of lobbying and
general public relations activities.
Most recently, in a nonschool case
from Illinois (Harris v. Quinn 2014),
the Supreme Court’s judgment could
foreshadow further restrictions in
Friedrichs over the ability of teacher
unions to collect fair-share fees.
Although stopping short of invalidating Abood, the Court decided
that health care workers could
not be compelled to pay fair-share
fees to support union speech and
expressive activities with which they
disagreed.
Against this backdrop, Friedrichs
has two potential major ramiﬁcations if the Supreme Court follows
its post-Abood trend.
First, if the justices continue to
restrict or eliminate the ability of
unions to collect fair-share fees
from nonmembers in the District
of Columbia and in about half of
the states allowing for this practice,
then teacher unions would face the
possible loss of signiﬁcant amounts
of revenues for nonbargaining activities, such as supporting political
candidates and other noneducational
initiatives.
Second, the possible elimination of
or having restrictions placed on fairshare fees may encourage members
to resign from their unions, thereby
further weakening the position of
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K–12 teacher unions. It bears watching for the impact that Friedrichs
may have on K–12 teacher unions
and their school systems.
Conclusion
The death of a sitting justice is
uncommon, so when it does occur,
it can have major consequences.
Justice Scalia was a long-time critic
of race-based admissions in higher
education, and his death is likely
to have a greater impact on Fisher
than Friedrichs because he would,
in all probability, have been in the
majority if, as anticipated, a closely
divided Supreme Court invalidated
the afﬁrmative action policy at
issue (Barnes 2016). The upshot is
that Fisher appears to be destined
to end in a 4–4 plurality, meaning
that without a clear majority, it is a
deadlock that would leave the lower
court order upholding the policy
in place but not providing binding
precedent as guidance. Thus, Justice Scalia’s death will likely leave
the status of race-based admissions
unresolved and in need of additional
litigation.
Justice Scalia’s death is less likely
to have as signiﬁcant an impact in
Friedrichs because, on the basis of
oral arguments before the Court,
commentators sensed that the issue
of whether unions can continue
to charge agency fees to nonmembers would not have hinged on a
single vote, his or another justice’s
(Ahlquist 2016).
These two key education cases
aside, with the Supreme Court just
about evenly divided between, to use
common labels, activist or liberal
and originalist or conservative justices, Justice Scalia’s death is likely
to tip this delicate balance in many
areas affecting American schooling
and all areas of the broader society.
It certainly bears watching to see
who will be appointed in Justice Scalia’s stead on the high court bench.
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State Funding for Education,
continued from page 34
• The formula has not changed to
accommodate disproportionate
increases in special education
and health insurance, thus actual
required expenditures for those
two categories are signiﬁcantly
higher than planned and the
money must come from the other
seven categories, avoiding harm to
classroom instruction to the greatest extent possible.
• Schools continue to demand additional funding in order to provide
teacher and student coaching to
excel on high-stakes exams.
• Public employees in Massachusetts, including most school
personnel, belong to unions. Contracts dictate not only compensation and beneﬁts, but terms of the
working day, year, and to some
extent, duties.
• Salaries are comparatively high,
in part because Massachusetts
has a high cost of living, and also
because teachers are required to
be certiﬁed in their instructional
ﬁelds and must have or obtain a
master’s degree by the end of their
ﬁfth year as a teacher.
• Administrative and support staffs
and services are being stretched
past the breaking point.
Clearly there continue to be many
challenges to reaching the goal of
success for every student within the
limits of available resources.
Students come to school with
ever greater complexities in their
own lives and in their educational
needs. Increasingly in Massachusetts
the schools are seen as the place
where all needs—educational and
beyond—must be met.
Gail M. Zeman is a consulting school
business administrator and past president of the Massachusetts ASBO. Email:
gailzeman@gmail.com
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